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ESSAY
THE FOUNDING FATHERS
a conserving caucus in action
George W. Carey and Greg Weiner
George W. Carey (1933–2013), a longtime contributor to Modern Age, was one of the foremost authorities on 
the political theory of the American Founding. His voluminous writings included Basic Symbols of the American 
Political Tradition (with Willmoore Kendall), The Federalist: Design for a Constitutional Republic, and In Defense 
of the Constitution. He taught at Georgetown University for more than fifty years.  
Greg Weiner is assistant professor of political science at Assumption College in Worcester, Massachusetts, and 
the author of Madison’s Metronome: The Constitution, Majority Rule, and the Tempo of American Politics. 
Several fine and highly readable accounts of the Philadelphia Constitutional Con-
vention have appeared over the decades. 
What characterizes most of these works—as 
well as, we should add, the countless articles 
dealing with the Convention—is their focus 
not only on the delegates, their backgrounds 
and views, but also on the conflicts that 
arose between them during their delibera-
tions. Perhaps most prominent among these 
readings is John Roche’s seminal essay “The 
Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in 
Action,” which casts delegates to the Con-
vention as politicians rather than as theorists 
and emphasizes their employment of com-
promise to overcome conflict.1 The result, 
Roche writes, is that “the careful observer of 
the day-to-day work of the Convention finds 
no over-arching principles.” Such principles 
as appear to exist, he suggests, were retro-
spective justifications applied to the products 
of compromise. This focus is quite under-
standable, if for no other reason than that it 
provides a context for a better understanding 
of the dynamics of the Convention, how 
differences of interest and theoretical persua-
sion were reconciled, and why the Constitu-
tion took the form it did. Such is the case, 
to take the most dramatic example, with the 
well-known account of the “large state, small 
state controversy” that almost resulted in the 
breakdown of the Convention. 
Yet this portrait of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion as a “reform caucus” overlooks the con-
siderable extent to which the delegates were 
constrained by, and therefore only relatively 
modestly modified, long-established political 
forms in use in the American colonies and 
states for decades. This is to say, they showed 
an inclination to follow John Dickinson’s 
admonition, “Experience must be our only 
guide. Reason may mislead us.”2 In this sense, 
the Convention was less a reform caucus than 
a conserving one. Indeed, while it is undeni-
ably true that the delegates were skilled at 
the art of compromise, the Convention was 
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also characterized by a remarkable degree of 
consensus on fundamental matters of gover-
nance. This consensus reached not merely the 
republican underpinnings of the regime but 
also several particulars as to its form, such as 
bicameralism and the separation of powers. 
Roche correctly notes that the framers were 
not abstract theorists, but they were theo-
retically sophisticated. The general absence of 
abstract theory in their debates may largely 
reflect the fact that few fundamental theo-
retical issues were in dispute; on the contrary, 
such conflicts as did exist pertained largely to 
the best practical means of realizing ideals on 
which the overwhelming proportion of del-
egates agreed. The sheer magnitude of the task 
before the delegates—that of uniting inde-
pendent and largely sovereign states under 
one government—would probably have been 
impossible lacking a consensus on the basic 
principles of governance. Moreover, given the 
speed with which the Convention completed 
its work, this consensus clearly had to embrace 
a number of concrete matters of governance, 
principally those relating to the procedures 
and structures of government necessary for 
the realization of the basic principles.
Equally important, a major source of this 
consensus, we believe, is to be found in the 
American political tradition, starting with 
the principles and practices of government 
stretching back to the earliest colonial 
times. Prior forms provided the basis of 
broad consensus and set practical boundar-
ies to the options available to the framers. 
Consequently, the most important areas of 
consensus did not need to be “arrived” at 
or achieved by compromise to begin with; 
they were supplied by experience. To put 
this otherwise, if we place the Philadel-
phia Convention and its handiwork into a 
broader historical perspective, we encounter 
again a trait in the American political tradi-
tion that was evident in the period leading 
up to the Revolution, that which Friedrich 
von Gentz identified as a “lack of abstract 
theory.”3 On Gentz’s showing, the American 
Revolution, quite unlike the French, could 
even be considered reactionary, since the 
colonists sought a return to the conditions 
that prevailed during the colonial period of 
“salutary neglect.”
We do not mean to suggest that the framers 
were copycats. Clearly this was not the case. 
Nor could it be, given the need to address the 
delicate issues surrounding federalism and 
what the role of the states in the structure 
and processes of the new government should 
be, matters about which the political tradi-
tion was largely silent. Moreover, they looked 
upon their political institutions and tradition 
with a critical eye, acknowledging the fail-
ures and weaknesses of state constitutions. 
In this sense, the prior experiences indicated 
what avenues should not be traveled, or they 
pointed to potential dangers in some of the 
institutional or procedural arrangements 
set before the Convention. Yet, as even this 
“negative” role reveals, the political tradition 
served to establish crucial parameters in the 
debates and deliberations of the Convention; 
that is, it not only provided the common 
grounds and shared experiences for a mean-
ingful exchange of views; it also limited the 
range of potential alternative arrangements 
the framers would consider. 
This consensus reached a remarkable array 
of issues that covered virtually the full range 
of questions political theorists might ask 
about a new regime, including its form—
republican—and such institutional arrange-
ments as separation of powers. The Virginia 
Plan, the template on which the Conven-
tion’s deliberations were based, supplies a 
compelling example. Virtually every feature 
of it that received serious consideration by 
the delegates can be clearly traced to prior 
forms. The plan of a lower house electing an 
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upper house—famously attributed to James 
Madison’s study of David Hume4—in fact 
appears in the colonies as early as the Fun-
damental Orders of Connecticut and in the 
postrevolutionary constitutions of Georgia 
and South Carolina, as well as in Charles 
Pinckney’s draft of a national plan of govern-
ment.5 Its commitments to bicameralism 
and establishment of three separate branches 
of government, as will be seen below, mir-
ror nearly the entirety of state constitutions. 
The Council of Revision, comprising rep-
resentatives from the executive and judicial 
branches, was based on a similar institution 
in New York. Only the national negative on 
state laws could be called innovative, yet this 
measure pertained largely to federalism and 
was, in any event, less a source of controversy 
at the Convention than a simple nonstarter 
that never stood a serious chance. 
Similarly—and in stark contrast to the 
many historical accounts that emphasize the 
possibility that abuses of popular rule might 
drive the nation to monarchy—the delegates 
evince an almost unanimous consensus that 
the new government would not only be 
republican but would also tilt toward the 
populist end of the republican spectrum. 
Once the decisive question of whether the 
new regime would operate on individuals 
was settled, no one questioned that its center 
of gravity would be a lower house elected by 
the people for relatively brief terms. Indeed, 
given the paucity of evidence to the contrary, 
it is difficult to see how the idea that republi-
canism was in danger ever took such a strong 
hold on the historiography of the found-
ing. The Convention never considered any 
regime other than republican; and, indeed, 
so prevalent was the consensus in favor of the 
republican form that the rare comments rais-
ing concerns about that prospect are notable 
chiefly for the almost bashful tone of apology 
that attended them. Dickinson, for example, 
spoke admiringly on June 2 of the British 
system, but hastened to add that a “limited 
Monarchy however was out of the question.” 
Hamilton, for his part, was sufficiently self-
conscious about his British-style proposal on 
June 18 that he had to beg “Gentlemen of 
different opinions [to] bear with him” on the 
subject.
To be sure, disagreement over various 
aspects of these principles and how best they 
could be secured was substantial, though 
nowhere near as intense as that over a range of 
issues surrounding federalism (for example, 
what the role of the states should be in the 
central government, the extent of national 
power vis-à-vis the states)—the one issue, 
again, on which the tradition provided the 
least guidance. Nevertheless, the delegates—
all of whom at least acknowledged the 
need for a stronger national government—
recognized the necessity of tackling these 
issues. In relatively short order, consensus 
on these matters produced an understanding 
that the Articles of Confederation had to 
be abandoned, that the Convention would 
have to ignore that part of their instructions 
officially authorizing the Convention “for 
the sole and express purpose of revising the 
Articles of Confederation.” Thus, in several 
key areas of the Convention’s work, we can 
see broad consensus bounded by experience:
Abandonment of Articles and Scope of 
National Powers. The introduction of the 
Virginia (or Randolph) Plan on May 29, 
just the third working day of the Conven-
tion, was a clear indication that the Articles 
of Confederation would be scrapped. This 
plan abandoned the defining character-
istics of the confederate model: its key 
institution—the “prime mover,” so to speak, 
within the system—was a popularly elected 
lower chamber of a bicameral legislature, 
with its representation proportioned among 
the states according to population, and its 
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laws operating upon individuals rather than 
the states. To be sure, there were some who 
believed that the Convention, in deliberating 
on the Virginia Plan, was going beyond its 
mandate from Congress or the instructions 
of their state legislatures. On May 30, for 
instance, George Read of Delaware points 
out that “deputies from Delaware were 
restrained by the commissions from assent-
ing to any change of the rule of suffrage” 
from that of equality of state representation. 
The major assault on the Virginia Plan comes 
on June 9 from William Paterson, who goes 
beyond charging that the Convention was 
acting beyond its legal authority in abandon-
ing equal state representation to maintain-
ing that such abandonment would not be 
endorsed by the people. 
Paterson’s remarks, as well as his introduc-
tion on June 15 of the Small State or New Jer-
sey Plan as an alternative to the Virginia Plan, 
however, must be placed in context. In many 
ways, his plan conformed to the Convention’s 
official mandate simply to alter the Articles, 
although, taken as a whole, these alterations 
were substantial. For instance, it did go a long 
way in meeting the objectives of those who 
wanted a stronger union, such as that envi-
sioned in the Virginia Plan, by granting the 
central government taxing powers and control 
over interstate and foreign commerce, and by 
providing as well that its laws would be the 
“supreme law of the respective States.” This 
scope of federal powers extended to most of 
the same areas in which the Virginia Plan pro-
posed to empower the national government. 
It did not, to be sure, include farther-reaching 
ideas such as Madison’s national negative on 
state laws. But the important point to observe 
is that the divisions between the two per-
tained not to the scope of federal powers but 
rather to the institutional forms necessary to 
ensure that the states did not encroach on the 
national regime—a possibility all understood 
to be a potential problem, as indicated by 
Paterson’s proposal to empower the national 
government to enforce the collection of taxes 
within the states. 
The differences in institutional forms, to 
be sure, were no small things, but we can also 
see that the authority accorded to the national 
government by both the Virginia and New 
Jersey Plans reflects a remarkable degree of 
consensus within the Convention on mat-
ters that would, in the ratification debates, 
prove highly controversial. It would not be 
an exaggeration to say the plans agreed on all 
the important questions of authority. While 
other features of the New Jersey Plan—for 
example, those relating to the judiciary and 
plural executives—were not likely to gain 
much support in the Convention, the most 
notable and controversial provision was for a 
unicameral legislature with equality of state 
representation; that is, the retention of the 
Congress established by the Articles with 
even more extensive responsibilities. That 
Paterson would advance such a proposal in 
light of what had already transpired is, we 
believe, best understood as taking an extreme 
position to establish a “bargaining” stance 
from which a compromise could be secured 
that would embrace proportional representa-
tion in one chamber and equality of state 
representation in the second. Moreover, 
Paterson’s plan did not reflect any theoreti-
cal hostility to bicameralism: if the Congress 
was going to continue to serve as essentially 
a diplomatic body, the theoretical need for 
a second chamber dissipates. In any event, 
only two days—largely consisting of wither-
ing critiques by Wilson and Madison—are 
devoted to a discussion of Paterson’s plan. 
The abandonment of the Articles is rendered 
official on June 19 by a vote of 7–3, with the 
Maryland delegation divided, to abandon 
further consideration of the Paterson Plan 
and return to a consideration of the Virginia 
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Plan as “altered, amended, and agreed to.” 
The issue of representation in the second 
chamber, however, remained and would 
prove troublesome.
The Separation of Powers. In Federal-
ist No. 47, Madison writes of separation 
of powers that “no political truth is . . . of 
greater intrinsic value, or . . . stamped with 
the authority of more enlightened patrons of 
liberty.”6 A survey of the state constitutions 
adopted after the Declaration of Indepen-
dence would seem to bear out Madison’s 
appraisal. Of the six states that prefaced their 
constitutions with a statement or declaration 
of rights, four expressly called for the separa-
tion of the three branches of government. 
The “Declaration of Rights” for the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution of 1780 contains 
the most elaborate statement regarding this 
separation and its purpose: “. . . the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive 
and judicial powers, or either of them; the 
executive shall never exercise the legislative 
and judicial powers, or either of them; the 
judicial shall never exercise the legislative 
and executive powers, or either of them, to 
the end that it [the Massachusetts govern-
ment] may be a government of laws and 
not of men.” The first article in the body of 
the Georgia Constitution of 1777 is more 
succinct: “The legislative, executive, and 
judiciary departments shall be separate and 
distinct, so that neither exercise the powers 
properly belonging to the other.” 
While other state constitutions were not 
as explicit as Georgia’s, their basic frames of 
government clearly reveal a concerted effort 
to adhere to this principle. It bears emphasis 
that these rhetorical declarations of devotion 
to the separation of powers appear in the 
revolutionary constitutions as an explicit 
theoretical justification for institutions that 
had long evolved—a self-conscious invo-
cation of the authority of Montesquieu. 
So prevalent was Montesquieu’s authority 
on this matter—he has been rated as the 
most often cited theoretical figure on the 
American shores during the era7—that any 
departure from the principle of separation of 
powers would have required clear justifica-
tion. It is the absence of such commentary, 
not the presence of it, that proves the extent 
of consensus on this principle.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Virginia 
Plan embraced the separation of powers, 
even though Madison himself would come 
to regard its protections for the principle as 
insufficient. That the Paterson Plan, which 
sought to salvage the Articles, also incor-
porated separation of powers might, at first 
blush, seem unusual. Yet the mere fact that 
this plan provided for an energetic govern-
ment that could enforce its will upon the 
states, quite unlike the state of affairs under 
the Articles, necessitated a division of powers 
in order to have any chance of success within 
the Convention.
Following on the analysis of Montesquieu, 
Federalist No. 47 makes it clear that the 
purpose of separation of powers is to prevent 
arbitrary rule. The decisive point to notice is 
that the Convention was undivided on the 
importance of that principle. The fault lines 
that emerged centered not on the theoreti-
cal foundations of separation of powers but 
rather on different opinions as to the insti-
tutional threats to it and the proper insti-
tutional responses: some delegates wanted 
to strengthen the executive and judiciary 
against an encroaching legislature; others, 
to weaken the presidency lest its occupant 
become tyrannical; and still more favored a 
strict and inviolable separation between all 
three branches. But the separation of powers 
was not an accidental by-product of extrane-
ous institutional debates.
The degree of consensus surrounding the 
separation of powers is evident in the fact that 
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certain important lines pertaining to it were 
drawn early in the proceedings. The Virginia 
Plan called for a Council of Revision that 
would empower “the Executive and a conve-
nient number of the National Judiciary” to 
veto measures passed by the legislature. Both 
Madison and James Wilson were persistent 
and forceful proponents of uniting the judi-
ciary with the executive, seeking adoption of 
this provision on June 6 and July 21 without 
success. What can rightly be called a third 
effort, on August 15, took the form of allow-
ing either “the Executive” or the “Supreme 
Judiciary Departments” to exercise a veto: if 
both vetoed, “3/4 of each House” would be 
required to override; if only one, “2/3 of each 
House.” This proposal was soundly rejected 
by an 8–3 vote.
Why were Madison and Wilson so persis-
tent in seeking this union of the two depart-
ments? The reason was to retain rather than 
to jettison the separation of powers. The 
principal justification for their efforts is to 
be found in Madison’s remarks of July 17 to 
the effect that at the state level the legisla-
tures have aggrandized virtually all powers 
and that a meaningful separation of pow-
ers therefore does not obtain. He notes as 
well that “the Executives of the States are 
in general little more than Cyphers; the 
legislatures omnipotent.” On July 21 he 
repeats his concern in even more alarming 
and specific terms: “Experience in all the 
States had evinced a powerful tendency in 
the Legislature to absorb all power into its 
vortex. This was the real source of danger to 
the American Constitutions; & suggested 
the necessity of giving every defensive 
authority to the other departments that was 
consistent with republican principles.” On 
August 15, Wilson points out that, while 
tyranny was most commonly associated 
with a “formidable” “Executive,” “where 
the Executive is not formidable” tyranny 
should appropriately be linked with the 
legislature. 
Thus, their primary purpose was to 
protect the two weaker departments, the 
executive and judiciary, from legislative 
aggrandizement—again, to preserve the 
separation of powers in practice. As Wilson 
put this at an earlier point in the debates, on 
July 21, “the joint weight of the two depart-
ments was necessary to balance the single 
weight of the Legislature.” Equally impor-
tant, however, such a union would render 
the exercise of the veto power in the face of 
legislative aggrandizement more likely. The 
executive standing alone might not have the 
confidence, firmness, or courage, deficien-
cies overcome by uniting with the judiciary. 
Yet Madison, speaking on the same day, 
doubted that even this union of executive 
and judicial branches would do the job; “the 
Legislature,” he believed, “would still be an 
overmatch for them.”
The debate over the Council of Revision 
assumes importance because its opponents, 
while not opposed to the ends sought by its 
proponents, hold to a vision of separated 
powers and what its implementation required 
that eventually wins out and finds expression 
in the Constitution. On June 6 Dickinson 
succinctly set forth the overriding objection, 
namely, that the “junction of the Judiciary” 
with the executive branch “involved an 
improper mixture of powers.” Earlier, on 
June 4, Elbridge Gerry, apparently the most 
vocal opponent of this provision, observed 
that judging “the policy of public measures” 
was “foreign” to the judicial function. Fol-
lowing upon this, Rufus King maintained 
that “the Judges ought to be able to expound 
the law as it should come before them, free 
from the bias of having participated in its 
formation.” Caleb Strong, on July 21, makes 
essentially the same point: “The Judges 
in exercising the function of expositors 
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might be influenced by the part they had 
taken . . . in framing the laws.” Luther Mar-
tin is even more emphatic in rejecting any 
role for the judges in the legislative process 
on largely different grounds: “A knowledge 
of Mankind, and of Legislative affairs can-
not be presumed to belong in a higher degree 
to the Judges than to the Legislature.” Not 
unrelated to Martin’s objection is Pinckney’s 
observation regarding Madison’s final pro-
posal of August 15 that “the interference of 
the Judges in the Legislative business . . . will 
involve them in parties, and give a previous 
tincture to their opinions.”
Looking at this dispute from a wider per-
spective, the major difference between those 
who favored this combination of executive 
and judicial powers and those who opposed 
it revolved around their respective estimates 
of the capacity of the legislature to over-
whelm the executive and judicial branches. 
All, however, were united in a theoretical 
commitment to separation of powers, which 
in fact motivated these other disputes. 
Greatly influenced, no doubt, by what they 
witnessed taking place in the states after 
independence, those who sought to fortify 
the executive called for checks on the leg-
islature that would be extremely difficult to 
overcome. Indeed, some suggested that the 
only sure remedy against legislative tyranny 
resided in giving the executive an absolute 
veto.8 Those opposed to these measures sim-
ply did not view the legislative threat in such 
an apocalyptic light.
At the same time, a wider perspective also 
reveals fundamental grounds of agreement 
that in the end served to facilitate com-
promise on one of the most critical issues 
confronting the Convention. Put otherwise, 
even though the proposal to unite the execu-
tive and judicial branches to fend off legisla-
tive encroachments was rejected, there was 
still a consensus that the executive needed a 
check on the legislature in order to prevent 
tyranny from that quarter. As Nathaniel 
Gorham observed during the debate on July 
21, the last time the Council of Revision 
was proposed, “All agree that a check on the 
legislature is necessary.” And in fact, from 
an early stage in the deliberations (June 4), 
a solid majority backed an executive veto 
power whose override would require a two-
thirds vote in both legislative chambers—
the same requirement for an override of a 
governor’s veto contained in the New York 
and Massachusetts constitutions. 
The disputes surrounding these issues 
were, to be sure, substantial, but they should 
not obscure the degree to which the delegates 
were, so to speak, deliberating in the same 
political universe. That is, they understood 
the need for the separation of powers; they 
did agree that the legislature would have 
to be checked; they did appreciate the rea-
sons underlying their differences; and they 
were mindful of how their decisions would 
impinge upon other basic values, not the 
least of these being republicanism. In short, 
they shared the same basic objectives. Their 
eventual resolution of these differences came 
down to a matter of judgment: Would, for 
example, the independence of the judiciary 
suffer from even a partial union with the 
executive? Would a three-fourths override 
provision render the president too powerful? 
Would a two-thirds provision be sufficient to 
prevent legislative encroachment? 
The issue of who should elect the president 
perhaps better illustrates the fundamental 
agreement on principle that pervaded the 
deliberations. The Virginia Plan provided 
for the election of the executive by the com-
bined chambers of the legislature. Early in 
the deliberations key issues arise that will 
later be debated at some length: Who should 
elect the executive—the legislature or the 
people—and what should be his term of 
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office? On June 13 the Committee of the 
Whole reports on the Randolph Resolutions 
affirming the Convention’s prior decision 
that the executive be elected by the national 
legislature for a term of seven years, adding 
the proviso that he “be ineligible a second 
time.”9 On July 17 the delegates vote unani-
mously for election by the national legisla-
ture but also, on a 6–4 vote, eliminate the 
proviso barring reeligibility. On this issue 
the delegates apparently accepted Gouver-
neur Morris’s July 17 view that “ineligibil-
ity . . . tended to destroy the great motive to 
good behavior, the hope of being rewarded 
by a re-appointment. It was saying to him, 
make hay while the sun shines.”
The ramifications of the decision to allow 
for reeligibility were almost immediately 
apparent. Jacob Broome indicated that with 
reeligibility he was now for a shorter terms 
of office, preferring a longer term if “he had 
remained ineligible.” But James McClurg, in 
moving “to strike out the 7 years, and insert 
‘during good behavior,’ ” raised the issue that 
hit to the heart of the separation-of-powers 
principle. By eliminating the ineligibility 
clause, he argued, the executive “was put 
into a situation that would keep him depen-
dent forever on the Legislature; and he 
conceived the independence of the Executive 
to be equally essential with that of the Legis-
lature.” McClurg’s motion was supported by 
Gouverneur Morris, who at the same time 
indicated that “he was indifferent how the 
Executive should be chosen, provided he 
held his place by this tenure.”10 
Madison, in more extensive remarks, reit-
erated the point that “the Executive could 
not be independent of the Legislature, if 
dependent on the pleasure of that branch 
for a reappointment.” Invoking the authority 
of Montesquieu, he pointed to the conse-
quences of a union of these two branches: 
“tyrannical laws may be made that they 
may be executed in a tyrannical manner.” 
While it should be noted that even though 
Madison—unlike Wilson, with whom he 
shared almost identical views on the need 
for separation of powers—never endorsed 
life tenure for the executive, he nevertheless 
felt that McClurg’s motion deserved “a fair 
hearing & discussion, until a less objection-
able expedient” could be found to prevent 
legislative tyranny.
George Mason regarded “during good 
behavior” to be only “a softer name for an 
Executive for life,” and he raised the specter 
of a “hereditary Monarchy”; an “easy step,” 
in his view, if the “good behavior” provision 
were adopted. This charge drew denials of 
any such intention from McClurg, Madison, 
and Gouverneur Morris. Perhaps the most 
incisive of these was Madison’s argument 
that the preservation of republican govern-
ment “required some expedient for the pur-
pose” of restraining the legislature, but “in 
devising it” that “the genuine principles of 
that form . . . be kept in view.” 
On July 19, presumably in light of the dif-
ficulties attendant upon reeligibility, a major-
ity voted in favor of a motion by Oliver Ells-
worth for election by electors “appointed by 
the Legislators of the States” using a formula 
that would take state population into account 
in allotting electoral votes. But by July 24 a 
majority reversed this decision and returned 
to election by the national legislature, which 
prompted Gerry and Martin to move “to re-
instate the ineligibility of the Executive a 2d 
time.” Gerry, acknowledging the need for an 
executive independent of the legislature, went 
on to contend that “the longer the duration 
of his office the more will his dependence [on 
the legislature] be diminished,” and he sug-
gested terms of “10, 15, or even 20, years and 
[that he] be ineligible afterwards.”
Clearly there were those such as Gou-
verneur Morris for whom reeligibility was 
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critically important and who, therefore, 
could not accept any provision along the 
lines suggested by Gerry. King, for instance, 
stated that reeligibility was “too great an 
advantage for the small effect it will have on 
his independence.” It is with this in mind 
that Wilson, recognizing the difficulties 
that “spring from the mode of election,” set 
forth a proposal designed to overcome them 
and allow for reeligibility: “the Executive be 
elected for 6 years, by a small number, not 
more than 15 of the Natl. Legislature, to be 
drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and 
who should retire immediately and make the 
election without separating.” While Gou-
verneur Morris believed the plan worthy of 
consideration, Wilson’s plan failed to gain 
any traction. 
On July 26, after two days of debate 
and deliberation, Mason surveyed all the 
proposals suggested for the election of the 
executive—different modes of popular 
election, “election . . . by Electors chosen by 
the people,” election by state legislatures 
or by state governors, and Wilson’s lottery 
scheme—and concluded “that an election 
by the Natl. Legislature as originally pro-
posed . . . was the best.” On his motion, the 
original provision for a seven-year term with 
no reeligibility is adopted by a vote of 6–3 
with two states divided. This decision, as we 
know, did not settle the matter, nor given its 
deficiencies should we have expected it to. If 
nothing else, the debates and deliberation to 
this juncture, particularly in pointing up the 
difficulties associated with the election of the 
executive by the legislature, are sufficient to 
explain why the eventual resolution of this 
issue, election by the Electoral College, was 
gratifying to most of the delegates; namely, 
it ensured executive independence from the 
national legislature, along with a relatively 
short term and reeligibility. Added to this, 
of course, was the composite nature of the 
process that embodied both the federal prin-
ciple, by providing a role for the states, and 
the national principle, by apportioning dele-
gates largely on the basis of state population. 
Again, the give and take over this issue 
has to be understood in a wider context. The 
experiences at the state level, coupled with 
the basic strictures of the separation of pow-
ers and republicanism principles, provided 
the grounds upon which the deliberations 
proceeded. Put otherwise, these principles, 
perhaps imperfectly provided for in the state 
constitutions, were uppermost in the minds 
of the delegates. The debates centered not 
on the principle itself but over what was 
required to ensure its realization in practice. 
In the last analysis, this was a matter of judg-
ment. As Morris put it on July 24 amid the 
debates over executive-legislative relations, 
“It is most difficult of all to rightly balance 
the Executive. Make him too weak: The Leg-
islature will usurp his powers: Make him too 
strong. He will usurp on the Legislature.” 
Bicameralism. On June 20, in the midst 
of wide-ranging remarks in the Convention, 
Mason noted that while much had been said 
about the “unsettled mind of the people of 
America,” “he was sure” there were “two 
points” upon which “it was well settled,” 
namely, “an attachment to Republican Gov-
ernment” and “an attachment to more than 
one branch of the legislature.” He went on 
to observe that the constitutions of the states 
“accord so generally in both these circum-
stances, that they seem to have been pre-
concerted.” “This,” he believed, “must either 
have been a miracle, or have resulted from 
the genius of the people.” Attributing the 
attachment to bicameralism to the genius 
of the people comes close to the mark, since 
there is good reason to believe—contrary 
to the supposition that Americans sought 
to “copy” the British model—it naturally 
evolved over time. 
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What is widely regarded to be the first 
American constitution, the Fundamental 
Orders of Connecticut (1639), reveals the 
earliest stage of this evolution, with its provi-
sion for the election of magistrates and gov-
ernor by the General Assembly. These magis-
trates, who are also members of the General 
Assembly, assumed executive responsibilities 
with the governor. Consequently they can 
be seen as standing somewhere between the 
legislative and executive departments. An 
amendment to the Fundamental Orders in 
1645 enhances considerably the magistrates’ 
legislative dimension by providing that they 
vote as a unit within the General Assembly, a 
majority of their number being necessary for 
the passage of legislation.11 Finally, in keep-
ing with the logic of this change, in 1698 
the General Assembly is divided into two 
houses—an “Upper House” and a popularly 
elected “Lower House”—with the provision 
that “no act shall be passed . . . but by the 
consent of both houses.”12 
The Connecticut evolution is not unique. 
In 1644 a Massachusetts ordinance, after 
noting “inconveniences” associated with 
“magistrates & deputies sitting together” in 
one assembly, ordained that “the magistrates 
may sit & act business by themselves” and 
that their concurrence is necessary for the 
enactment of laws.13 Likewise, the Rhode 
Island charter was amended in 1666 so that 
“the deputyes may sitt apart from the magis-
trates as a House by themselves; and conse-
quently the magistrates to sitt as a House by 
themselves; and that of these two houses may 
consist the law makeing power.”14 The move 
to bicameral legislatures was not confined 
to New England: by 1643, the Governor’s 
Council, which had been part of the original 
Virginia Grand Assembly, a unitary body 
established in 1619, became a separate second 
legislative chamber, the other being the House 
of Burgesses.15 In fact, Virginia’s bicameral 
arrangement, wherein an appointed gover-
nor’s council constituted a second legislative 
chamber, is that which eventually emerges in 
all the royal and proprietary colonial govern-
ments save Pennsylvania and Georgia.
Without going into the details of the con-
stitutions adopted by the states, both before 
and after the formal separation from Great 
Britain, certain trends should be noted. The 
most notable, of course, is that the governor’s 
councils—a feature of the royal colonies—
are eliminated, though their functions are 
assumed by new constitutional arrangements. 
These arrangements varied somewhat. The 
New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided 
that an upper chamber, the “Legislative 
Council,” should be elected, but provided 
as well that the governor, elected by both 
Houses, should be “President of the Coun-
cil,” thereby still linking the council to the 
executive. Delaware’s constitution indicates 
the path followed by most states: the gover-
nor’s council was replaced by an elected body, 
the “Council,” which constituted the upper 
chamber. In addition, there was provision for 
a “privy council” whose duties were primarily 
executive in character. The Maryland consti-
tution likewise provided for the election of 
the upper house and a “privy council” with 
largely executive duties. Following Virginia’s 
example, the North Carolina constitution 
provides for election to both legislative 
chambers and establishes a “Council of State” 
whose main function is to “advise the Gover-
nor in the execution of his office.”
Quite aside from the more or less natural 
evolution, there was widespread agreement for 
bicameral legislatures on theoretical grounds. 
John Adams’s widely circulated “Thoughts on 
Government” (1776), which offered principles 
that should guide states in the drafting of 
new constitutions in the wake of their inde-
pendence from Great Britain, was a highly 
influential work that defended the necessity 
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of bicameralism to maintain liberty. Here 
Adams, a proponent of “mixed” government, 
indicts unicameral legislatures on various 
grounds, the first being the “passion, flight 
of enthusiasm . . . or prejudice . . . productive of 
hasty results and absurd judgments,” inher-
ent faults that require the steady hand of a 
second chamber either to stymie or correct. 
Like considerations lead Wilson, the most 
democratically inclined convention delegate, 
to insist in his 1791 Lectures on Law that a 
second chamber was absolutely necessary in 
light of the “passions” and “prejudices” of a 
single assembly that would, if left unchecked, 
eventually produce “despotism, injustice, 
and cruelty.”16 In short, the need for a second 
chamber was widely recognized across the 
political spectrum, a state of affairs that could 
not help but be reflected in the Convention. 
The composition and character of the 
second or “upper” chambers in both the 
colonial and the period between the Dec-
laration and the Constitution provided a 
consensus, to some degree tacit, on certain 
critical issues surrounding the form and 
function of the second chamber. To begin 
with, in keeping with both the morality and 
practice of the colonial and state govern-
ments, as well as with the more theoretical 
injunctions, they wanted an upper chamber 
that would be more sedate and deliberative 
than the lower. Above all, it was assumed 
that a second chamber, like the councils in 
the colonial and state governments, should 
closely examine the legislative output of the 
lower chamber with an eye to determining 
whether it was suitable and, if so, how it 
might be improved. To realize this, in turn, 
it was understood that the second chamber 
should have fewer members than the lower in 
order to facilitate the necessary deliberation. 
There were still other critical features of a 
second chamber upon which there was con-
sensus. That the terms for its members should 
be longer than for those of the lower cham-
bers was a widely held position that gained 
strength even over the course of the delib-
erations. On June 12, Randolph proposes 
a seven-year term for the upper chamber in 
order to ensure “firmness & independence”; a 
proposal immediately supported by Madison 
on grounds that such a term would provide a 
critically needed “stability” in order to check 
the excesses of the lower chamber. Later, on 
June 26, again expressing his concern that 
the second chambers in the states have been 
no match for the lower chamber, he again 
maintains that “considerable duration ought 
to be given” the upper chamber, even terms of 
nine years. On the same day, Wilson observes 
that in addition to concerns over “anarchy 
& tyranny,” the Senate “will probably” have 
responsibilities relating to foreign relations 
and “treaties” that would render lengthy 
terms desirable in order to promote “respect-
ability in the eyes of foreign Nations.”17 
In this Wilson is implying that the Sen-
ate would share certain functions with the 
executive, not unlike the councils and upper 
chambers of the colonies and states. And, 
not unexpectedly, this turns out to be the 
case. Underlying all the formal constitu-
tional provisions relating to term, size, and 
functions was a recognition, largely implicit, 
but articulated by Madison on June 26, 
that a properly constituted second chamber 
might well come to be respected by the 
people for its “wisdom & virtue,” thereby 
posing an effective and republican check 
on the ill-conceived measures of the lower 
chamber. Setting the minimum age for eligi-
bility for the Senate at thirty, compared with 
twenty-five for the House, thereby seeking 
to provide for a more mature membership, 
may be understood as one small step in this 
direction. So, too, was their insistence on 
some form of filtered election, another staple 
of both the colonial and state governments.
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This consensus is underscored rather 
than impaired by Paterson’s proposal for a 
unicameral legislature. Paterson’s proposal 
was made before consensus emerged that the 
new regime would operate on individuals, 
thus removing the theoretical motivation 
for bicameralism. Paterson’s legislature, like 
that of the Articles, was—to borrow John 
Adams’s metaphor—less a legislative body 
than a diplomatic assembly. The key fact to 
observe is that once the Convention agreed 
that it would instead function as a Congress 
with authority over individuals rather than 
states, all parties—including those still 
pushing for the states to retain some sover-
eignty—apparently agreed that a bicameral 
legislature was needed.
In sum, while the principled differences 
over who or what the Senate should represent 
have understandably been a focus of attention 
among students of the Convention, what is 
often overlooked are the areas of consensus or 
substantial agreement that rendered the del-
egates’ task manageable and the fact that this 
consensus arose substantially from experi-
ence. Had they begun their deliberations on a 
second chamber de novo, without the benefit 
of the prior political tradition, it is doubtful 
they would have reached any resolution. 
 
The foregoing has attempted to establish that the delegates to the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 began 
their work with a broad-based consensus on 
core theoretical matters and, further, that 
this consensus was guided and bounded by 
the long-standing practice of the states. The 
importance of this consensus for understand-
ing the American political tradition is myriad. 
Most clearly, it underscores the fact that Amer-
ican political institutions are the products of 
a steady evolution reaching back to the earli-
est colonial institutions, not a sudden burst 
of innovation in Philadelphia, and still less 
of theoretical contemplation detached from 
experience. However, and equally important, 
the fact that the framers relied on experience 
does not diminish the theoretical sophistica-
tion or coherence of their work. This is true 
not merely because their gradualism and cau-
tion itself arose from a theoretical suspicion of 
detached reason. One of the most important 
features of the American political tradition 
is that it is characterized not by ad hoc insti-
tutional design—as Roche suggests—but 
rather by theory arising from practice. Put 
otherwise, Gentz’s distinction between the 
American and French Revolutions was that 
the former was not the product of “abstract” 
theory. It is far from the case, however, that 
a lack of abstract theory indicates an absence 
of theoretical grounding altogether. On the 
contrary, the American tradition exhibits a 
commitment to theory moored to practice. 
Roche, arguing otherwise, describes 
Madison and Hamilton as “inspired pro-
pagandists with a genius for retrospective 
symmetry” for having, in The Federalist, 
draped the product of a “reform caucus” 
in theoretical garb after the fact.18 But this 
overlooks the extent to which the theoreti-
cal consensus at the Convention arose from 
a continuous practice of introspection 
nearly two centuries in the making before 
the delegates arrived in Philadelphia. Such 
institutions as bicameralism and separation 
of powers evolved from gradual and cautious 
speculation in the states that was anchored 
to practice and bounded by awareness of the 
limits of abstract reason. The framers’ silence 
on many theoretical matters reflects the 
extent to which this consensus existed, and 
their decision to embrace it, in turn, reflects 
both their own theoretical commitment to 
gradualism and their inheritance of a long 
and coherent theoretical tradition they chose 
to retain. That makes the Convention less a 
“reform” caucus than a conserving one.
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Finally, the foregoing considerations also 
cast serious doubt on Madison’s much-
vaunted role as “Father of the Constitution.” 
This encomium derives in considerable mea-
sure from his presumptive authorship of the 
Virginia Plan, which, as we have seen, served 
as the basis of the Convention’s substantive 
deliberations. Yet the theoretical arguments 
Madison adduced within the Convention 
and in The Federalist, especially with respect 
to separation of powers, seem largely incom-
patible with core features of the Virginia Plan. 
The case is complicated by the fact that only 
circumstantial evidence connects Madison to 
the plan. He does outline some of its core fea-
tures in correspondence with Washington as 
well as Edmund Randolph in advance of the 
Convention, but these letters do not specify 
the modes of election—the lower house 
electing the upper and each of them electing 
the president—that seem incompatible with 
his position on separation of powers.19 The 
primary elements these letters do specify are 
either compatible with long tradition, such 
as bicameralism and representation, or—as 
in the case of the scope of federal powers—
proved largely uncontroversial because their 
necessity was generally seen as self-evident. 
As we have seen, the only theoretically novel 
device these letters propose is Madison’s much 
criticized proposal for a national negative on 
state laws. Not only was this device repeat-
edly defeated, it would not be too much to 
say it never received serious consideration—a 
fact that concerned Madison enough that he 
predicted the Constitution would fail because 
of it. This suggests that Madison may have 
been accurate, not merely modest, when he 
famously described the Constitution as “the 
product of many minds.” The overwhelming 
influence of tradition on constitutional forms 
shows it was the product of many decades as 
well.
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